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This article surveys 2015 developments in National Security Law relevant to
international lawyers.'
I. Cybersecurity Developments
Several important cybersecurity developments have occurred during the past year. As
discussed below, these included three main developments: (i) the enactment of several
cybersecurity-related laws; (ii) the implementation of regulations requiring certain kinds
of government contractors to disclose when significant cybersecurity breaches have
occurred under certain circumstances; and (iii) the promulgation of an Executive Order
that would permit the President to impose sanctions on foreign entities found to have
engaged in cyber-attacks on U.S. persons.
In December 2014, several cybersecurity-related bills were passed by Congress and
signed into law by President Obama. The Cybersecurity Work Force Assessment Act
requires the Director of Homeland Security, within 180 days after enactment of the law
and annually thereafter for three years, to conduct an assessment of the cybersecurity
workforce of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 2 The National
Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to
establish the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (Center) in
DHS to carry out the responsibilities of the DHS Under Secretary responsible for
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1. For developments during 2014, see James D. Carlson et al., National Securty Law, 49 ABA/SIL YIR
(n.s.) 373 (2015).
2. Cybersecurity Work Force Assessment Act, Pub. L. No. 113-246, 128 Stat. 2880 (2014) (to be codified
at 6 U.S.C. § 146).
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overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and related DHS programs;
requires the Center to be the federal civilian interface for sharing cybersecurity risks,
incidents, analysis, and warnings for federal and non-federal entities; and directs the
center to enable real-time, integrated, and operational actions across federal and non-
federal entities. 3 The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 provides for the
establishment of ongoing, voluntary public-private partnership to improve cybersecurity
and authorizes the U.S. Government to support research, raise public awareness of cyber
risks, and improve the nation's cybersecurity workforce.4
In addition to the laws referenced above, cybersecurity-related provisions are included
in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (CFCAA), which
President Obama signed into law on December 16, 2014,1 and the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (NDAA), which President Obama signed into law
on December 19, 2014.6 Pursuant to section 515 of the CFCAA, the U.S. Department of
Commerce (DOC), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation (NSF) must assess
the risk of cyberespionage or sabotage before acquiring "high-impact" or "moderate
impact" information technology systems (Covered Information Systems). The groups
must utilize criteria developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) and they must review supply chain risk from the presumptive awardee against
available threat information provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
other federal agencies.7 Separately, pursuant to section 1632 of the NDAA, the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) is mandated, within ninety days of the NDAA's
enactment, to establish procedures requiring the reporting of cyber incidents related to
networks and information systems of "operationally critical contractors" (i.e., a contractor
defined under the NDAA as a contractor designated by the DOD as "critical source of
supply for airlift, sealift, intermodal transportation services, or logistical support that is
essential to the mobilization, deployment, or sustainment of the Armed Forces in a
contingency operation").8 Such procedures were ultimately promulgated in August 2015
and are discussed below.
With Congress experiencing some difficulty in passing strong cybersecurity legislation
in 2015,9 the Executive branch sought to fill the void by taking several assertive actions.
3. National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066 (2014) (to be
codified at 6 U.S.C. § 148).
4. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 (2014) (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 7422-7423).
5. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 515, 128 Sat.
2130 (2014) [hereinafter CFCAA].
6. Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, National Defense Authorization Actfor Fiscal Year 2015, Pub.
L. No. 113-291, §1632, 128 Stat. 3292 (2014) (NDAA).
7. CFCAA, spra note 5, § 515.
8. NDAA §1632.
9. In 2015, several cybersecurity-related bills were introduced in Congress. Two such bills made it
through the House: Protecting Cyber Networks Act of 2015, H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. (2015) (would seek to
improve United States' cybersecurity through enhanced sharing of information about cyber threats), and
National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015, H.R. 1731, 114th Cong. (2015) (would
enhance multi-directional sharing of information relating to cybersecurity risks and would strengthen privacy
and civil liberties protections). One made it through the Senate: Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of
2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015) (would improve cybersecurity in the United States through enhanced
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For example, pursuant to the requirements of section 1632 of the NDAA, and due in part
to massive cyber-attacks suffered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) during
the Summer of 2015 that resulted in sensitive data of more than 22 million current and
former U.S. Government employees and applicants being hacked, the DOD issued an
interim rule designed to enhance its cybersecurity posture.' 0 Under the interim rule,
which became effective on August 26, 2015, all DOD contractors and subcontractors that
may have "covered defense information" residing or transiting their systems are required
to (1) have "adequate security" consistent with the requirements set forth in NIST Special
Publication 800-171,11 unless a special variance is obtained from the DOD; (2) report any
cyber incidents "rapidly" to DOD and to provide it significant information about their
systems if the DOD opens an investigation into any such incident; and (3) implement and
maintain administrative, technical, and physical safeguards and controls with the security
level and services required in accordance with the DOD's Cloud Computing Security
Requirements Guide if cloud computing services are going to be used by the contractor in
connection with the performance of a contract with the DOD.12
President Obama also sought to improve the U.S. government's cybersecurity posture
when he signed Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015.13 Under this order, sanctions
can be imposed against three basic categories of designated individuals or entities. One
category relates to those that take part in "cyber-enabled activities" from outside the
United States that "are reasonably likely to result in, or have materially contributed to, a
significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial
stability of the United States."1 4 A second category pertains to those that are:
[R]esponsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, the receipt or use for
commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain, or by a commercial
entity, outside the United States of trade secrets misappropriated through cyber-
enabled means, knowing they have been misappropriated, where the
misappropriation of such trade secrets is reasonably likely to result in, or has
materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy,
or economic health or financial stability of the United States.' 5
In addition, anyone who provides material assistance, sponsorship, or financial,
material, or technological support, or goods or services in support of any of the targeted
activities may be subject to sanctions.1 6 Furthermore, U.S. persons are generally
prohibited from engaging in any dealings with entities designated under the order and any
sharing of information about cybersecurity threats). However, at the time of this writing, none of these three
bills seemed likely to be passed by the other chamber of Congress and signed into law by President Obama.
10. Supplement: Network Penetration Reporting and Contracting for Cloud Services (DFARS Case 2013-
D018), 80 Fed. Reg. 51,739 (Aug. 26, 2015) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 202, 204, 212, 239, and
252)[hereinafter DFARS regulation].
11. Ron Ross et al., Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and
Organizations, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY,
availahle at http://nvlpubs.rist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800- 171.pdf (Jun. 2015).
12. DFARS regulation, supra note 10.
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property or property interests of such designated entities within U.S. jurisdictions or held
by U.S. persons must be blocked.17
II. Nuclear Arms Control
In 2015, the United States and Russia continued to accuse each other of violating their
obligations under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,1s which prohibits the
development, possession, or testing of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with a
range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometers or of launchers for such missiles. In its 2015
Compliance Report,1 9 while stating that implementation of the New START Treaty 20 was
progressing well, the State Department again asserted that a GLCM developed by Russia
is prohibited under the INF treaty, and denied Russian allegations that some aspects of
the U.S. missile defense and armed unmanned aerial vehicle programs violate the INF
treaty. Neither the United States nor Russia has indicated an intention to withdraw from
the treaty.2 1 The State Department Compliance Report states that continued adherence
to the INF Treaty is in "the mutual security interests of all the Parties," and that the
United States "will continue to pursue resolution of concerns with Russia," 22 while the
Russian Foreign Ministry called for "businesslike" and "substantive" discussions to resolve
the disputes. 23
The 2015 Review Conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)24 ended without
agreement on a Final Document.25 The Conference was marked by "severe and
intensifying" conflict between the five nuclear weapons states recognized under the
treaty 26 and a majority of non-nuclear weapons states over implementation of the
obligation under Article VI of the NPT, "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
17. Id.
18. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, U.S.-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Dec. 8, 1987,
available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm.
19. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, 2015 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Jun. 5, 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2015/243224
.htm#Adherence [hereinafter 2015 Arms Control Report].
20. Measures for the Further Reduction and Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S., Russ., Apr. 10,
2010, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf
21. See Russia Threatens to Withdraw From Arms Treaties, STRATFOR (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.stratfor
.com/analysis/russia-threatens-withdraw-arms-treaties.
22. 2015 Arms Control Report, supra note 19.
23. Russia urges US to abandon 'megaphone dplomacy' in disarmament issues, RUSSIAN NEws AGENCY (Oct.
13, 2015), http://tass.ru/en/politics/828275.
24. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161,
available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcircl4.pdf
25. Press Release, NPT Review Conference, Consensus Eludes Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference as Positions Harden on Ways to Free Middle East of Mass Destruction Weapon, U.N Press
Release DC/3561 (May 22, 2015), available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/dc3561.doc.htm.
26. United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China, which are also the permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council, frequently referred to as "the P5." See The UNSecurity Council, UNITED NATIONS
FOUNDATION, http://www.unfoundation.org/what-we-do/issues/united-nations/the-un-security-council
.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/ (last visited Apr. 11,2016).
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disarmament." 2 7 By the conclusion of the conference, 107 non-nuclear weapons states
had signed a "Humanitarian Pledge,"2 8 originated by Austria, urging all parties to the
NPT to "pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination
of nuclear weapons." 29 While some international law experts argue that actual use of
nuclear weapons would violate the existing principles of international humanitarian law,
e.g., the requirement of discrimination between military and civilian targets, 30 the Manual
of the Law of War, issued by the U.S. Defense Department in June 2015, argues that the
legality of nuclear weapon use would depend on the circumstances. 31
In 2015, the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly 32 voted to establish an
Open Ended Working Group, open to all countries and not required to proceed by
consensus, for the purpose of "taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament
negotiations." 33 The resolution passed by a vote of 131 to 22 with 28 abstentions and
despite all P5 nations voting against it.34
The nuclear powers continued modernization of their nuclear forces in 2015. The U.S.
plan includes a new fleet of nuclear missile submarines, new penetration bombers and air-
launched cruise missiles, and a review of options for a new generation of intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs).31 Russia announced plans for an improved, new generation of
ICBMs, new bombers, and new land and sea-launched cruise missiles.36 China slightly
increased the size and substantially increased the capabilities of its arsenal, replacing older
missiles with improved versions.37 Pakistan3 8 and India 39 both modernized and
27. Kingston Reif, Next Steps on Disarmament Uncertain, 45 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 7, 33 (2015), available
at https://vww.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-
8#q=Next+Steps+on+Disarmament+Uncermin(eif.
28. Humanitarian Pledge, INT'L CAMPAIGN To ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www
.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/HINWV14viennaPledge_Document.pdf.
29. Emily Welty & Jonathan Frerichs, New Humanitarian Pledge to Ban Nuclear Weapons advances as troubled
treaty stalls, WORLD COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES (May 26, 2015), https://www.oikoumene.org/en/press-
centre/news/new-humanitarian-pledge-to-ban-nuclear-weapons-advances-as-troubled-treaty-stalls.
30. See, e.g., John Burroughs & Peter Weiss, Legal Gap or Compliance Gap?, 45 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 8,
36 (2015), available at https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_10/Letter-to-the-Editor/Legal%2OGap%20
or%20Compliance%2OGap.
31. Department of Defense Law of War Manual, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(June 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-june-2015.pdf.
32. The First Committee, consisting of all UN member states, "considers all disarmament and
international security matters within the scope of the [UN] Charter." Disarmament and International Security,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ga/first. First Committee
resolutions are normally adopted as a matter of course by the General Assembly when it meets in plenary
session. United Nations First Committee, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, http://www.nd.org/learn/treaties-
and-regimes/un-first-committee/ (last viewed Apr. 11, 2016).
33. Press Release, General Assembly, First Committee Approves 20 Drafts, Including New One
Containing Declaration Aimed at Relinquishing 'They versus Us' Approach to Nuclear Disarmament, UN
Press Release GA/DIS/3541, available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/gadis3541.doc.htrn.
34. Id.
35. H. Kristensen and R. Norris, U.S. Nuclear Forces 2015, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, available at
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/107.full.pdf+html.
36. H. Kristensen and R. Norris, Russian Nuclear Forces 2015, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, available at
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/04/13/0096340215581363.full.
37. H. Kristensen and R. Norris, Chinese Nuclear Forces 2015, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, availahle at
http://thebulletin.org/2015/july/chinese-nuclear-forces-20158459.
38. H. Kristensen and R. Norris, Pakistani Nuclear Forces 2015, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, availahle at
http://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Nov-Dec-Pakistan-FINAL.pdf.
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quantitatively expanded their nuclear arsenals. Pakistan also continued development of
smaller tactical warheads to deter a possible conventional arms invasion by India despite
U.S. concerns that this could increase the risk of nuclear escalation.40
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)4 1 has not yet entered into force, although
all nuclear-armed states except North Korea continued to observe a moratorium on
testing. According to its terms, entry into force requires that it be ratified by a specified
list of countries, including six nuclear powers that have not yet done so. 42 On October 21,
2015, the U.S. State Department announced that it would begin a renewed drive for
ratification but did not specify a timeline.4 3
In 2015, the FBI cooperated with Eastern European police in several arrests of
smugglers from the former Soviet Union seeking to sell radioactive material to Middle
Eastern extremists. 4 4 On July 31, 2015, the United States completed its ratification of the
Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.4" In August 2015,
the White House, citing "nuclear terrorism" as "the most immediate and extreme threat
to global security," announced plans for a fourth Nuclear Security Summit to be held in
Washington in 2016 on steps to secure vulnerable nuclear material and to disrupt nuclear
smuggling.46
The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) continued to press the suit it filed in 201447
in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the world's nuclear powers.4 8 The suit
alleges that the nuclear-armed states have breached their obligations under customary
international law and, as to the five NPT signatories under Article VI of that treaty, failed
39. H. Kristensen and R. Norris, Indian Nuclear Forces 2015, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, available at
http://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Nov-Dec-Pakistan-FINAL.pdf.




41. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, U.N.G.A. Doc. No. A/50/1027, opened for signature Sep. 24,
1996, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/ctbt/20fa.htm.
42. The United States, China and Israel have signed but not ratified; India, Pakistan, and North Korea
have not signed.
43. Statement by Secretary John Kerry, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at the Department of Energy's
Stockpile Stewardship Event, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 11, 2015), available at http://www.state.gove/secretary/
remarks/2015/10/24842 1.
44. Desmond Butler and Vadim Ghirda, AP Investigation: Nuclear Black Market Seeks IS Extremists,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Oct. 7, 2015), availahle at, http://bigstory.ap.org/urn:publicid:ap.org:6fdld202f40c4bb
4939bd99c3f80ac2b.
45. Jonathan Herbach and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, More Work to Do: A Pathway for Future Progress on
Strengthening Nuclear Security, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N, (Oct. 2015) http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/
2015_10/Features/More-Work-to-Do-A-Pathway-for-Future-Progress-on-Strengthening-Nuclear-
Security?utm source=Arms+Control+Association+E-Updates&ntncampaign=9ddacald99-Oct_2015_ACT
Feature&utm medium=email&ntm term=0Obfl 55ala2-9ddacald99-79427485.
46. Statement by the White House Press Secretary on the 2016 Nuclear Summit, (Aug. 10, 2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/10/statement-press-secretary-2016-nuclear-security-summit.
47. Press release, International Court of Justice, No.2014/18, (April 25, 2014), available at, http://www.icj-
cij.org/presscom/files/0/18300.pdf.
48. The five nuclear weapon states recognized under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), China, France,
Russia, United Kingdom and the U.S., as well as India, Pakistan and Israel (which are not parties to the NT)
and North Korea (which withdrew from the NPT).
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to pursue good-faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. 49 The three nuclear
states that have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ-India, Pakistan, and the
United Kingdom-have argued that the case is not within the jurisdiction of the court and
is not suitable for adjudication. 0 Hearings on the objections are expected to be held early
in 2016.1 Although the RMI asked the six nuclear powers that have not accepted the
ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction to appear and litigate the issues voluntarily, none have done
so.
5 2 The U.S. District for the Northern District of California dismissed a companion
case by the RMI against the United States and the dismissal has been appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. 3
III. International Response to Iran's Nuclear Program5 4
On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (otherwise termed the E3/EU+3)55 and Iran agreed to a
final accord5 6 addressing Iran's nuclear program. Coined the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action (JCPOA), it represents the culmination of twenty-two months of talks, which
began in 2012 with backchannel diplomacy facilitated by Oman.57
The JCPOA, which, as reproduced as an Annex to U.N. Security Council Resolution
2231,58 runs eighty-nine pages including Annexes and attachments, has a number of
features. Among them:
* The European Union and United States agree to list the entirety of their sanctions
and restrictive measures against Iran, the effects of lifting those sanctions,59 an
agreement to terminate sanctions, and a promise to refrain from re-introducing or
re-imposing sanctions, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided
for in the JCPOA.6 0
* Iran agrees:
49. The Marshall Islands' Nuclear Zero Cases in the International Court of Justice, The Lawyers Comm. On




53. NUCLEAR ZERO, In the Courts, http://www.nuclearzero.org/in-the-courts (Pleadings in the RMI case).
54. This brief overview may be read in conjunction with the last three Year-in-Review articles from the
National Security Law Committee, National Security Law, 49 ABA/SIL (n.s.) 373 (2015), National Security
Law, 48 ABA/SIL (n.s.) 474 (2014), and National Security Law, 47 ABA/SIR (n.s.) 456 (2013).
55. The "P5+1" was coined to signify the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus
Germany. The group is also referred to as the "E3/EU+3," signifying the three involved EU nations (i.e.,
Germany, United Kingdom, France) plus the United States, Russia, and China. Both terms are used
depending on the media source.
56. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Jul. 16, 2015, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/iran/indexen
.htrm, hereinafter "JCPOA." Annexes will be referred to as "Annex," the Roman numeral designator, and
section.
57. Laura Rozen, Inside the secret US-Iran dilomacy that sealed nuke deal, AL-MONITOR (Aug. 11, 2015),
available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/iran-us-nuclear-khamenei-salehi-jcpoa-
diplomacy.html, visited Nov. 28, 2015.
58. S.C. Res. 2231/15, Non-proliferation, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2231/15 (Jul., 20, 2015), available at http://www
.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2231(2015).
59. Annex II, sections A and B respectively.
60. JCPOA A.26, Annex II.
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o To limit uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities for eight
years, to be followed by a gradual evolution to the next stage of enrichment
activities for exclusively peaceful purposes. 61
o To limit centrifuge operations, development, and manufacturing.62 Centrifuges are
capped at 5,060 first generation IR-1 machines at its Natanz Fuel Enrichment
Plant (FEP) for ten years, 63 and 1,044 IR-1 machines at its Fordow Fuel
Enrichment Plant for fifteen years. 64 Its more advanced machines will be
permitted in numbers varying from one to thirty, depending on the type, for
testing.65
o To convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics, and technology center.
66
o To keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kilograms of up to 3.67% uranium
hexafloride (UF6) for fifteen years. 67
o To permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a long-term presence
for at least fifteen years, 68 to permit the IAEA to implement "continuous
monitoring . . . to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in
storage," 69 and to permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access . . . to
relevant buildings at Natanz."7 0
* The parties agree to establish a Joint Commission to monitor the JCPOA
implementation.71
* The parties agree to a conceptual redesign and subsequent rebuilding of the Arak
heavy water research reactor 72 "to support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope
production for medical and industrial purposes."73 The redesign will "minimize the
production of plutonium and not produce weapon-grade plutonium in normal
operation."7 4 The parties agreed to their respective roles in the reactor redesign, 75
and agreed to create a document that lays out their respective roles in greater detail. 76
The JCPOA includes an Implementation Plan, included as Annex V to the JCPOA,
describing the required sequence of actions. "Implementation Day," i.e., the day most
61. JCPOA Part A & Annex I, §§ F, H, I, J, P.
62. JCPOA ¶4, Annex I §§ F, G, K, R.
63. Annex I, § F. Down from 15,420 IR-1 centrifuges; INT'L ATomic ENERGY AGENCY, Implementation of
the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions ofSecurity Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic ofIran,
n. 23, U.N. Doc. GOV/2014/58 (Nov. 7,2014), available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2014-
58.pdf [hereinafter JAEA GOV/2014/58]. The Natanz facility also houses a Pilot FEP for research and
development, which houses smaller advanced IR-2M, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges. Id., ¶ 25.
64. Annex J, § H. This is down from 2,710. JAEA Doc. GOV/2014/58, supra note 63, n. 39.
65. Annex I, § G.
66. JCPOA T 6, Annex I § H.
67. JCPOA T 7, Annex I §J.
68. Annex J, § N.
69. Annex J, T 70.
70. Annex I, T 71.
71. Annex IV.
72. Annex I § B, Annex I Attachment.
73. Annex I 2.
74. Id.
75. Annex I § B.
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sanctions are removed, will occur "upon IAEA-verified implementation of nuclear-related
measures by Iran" described in Annex V paragraph 15, and upon completed actions by the
European Union, United States, and United Nations, in paragraphs 16, 17, and 18,
respectively. These actions reference specific paragraphs from Annexes I and II. The
JCPOA will terminate ten years from the date the Security Council Resolution endorses
the JCPOA.
The JCPOA was endorsed in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which includes,
inter alia,
* A United Nations Security Council agreement to terminate sanctioning resolutions77
and to remove "non-proliferation" as applied to the Iran nuclear issue "from the list
of matters of which the Council is seized."78
* Establishing a mechanism to reestablish the sanctioning resolutions should Iran
engage in behavior which constitutes a "significant non-performance of [its]
commitments under the JCPOA."79
* Requesting the IAEA to monitor and verify voluntary nuclear-related measures by
providing "regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors" and U.N. Security
Council.80
Lastly, the IAEA and Iran concluded a Road-map to resolve "by the end of 2015 ... all
past and present outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA and
Iran."s1 The remaining outstanding issues are provided in the annex of the 2011
Director's General report (GOV/2011/65) and the possible military dimensions at the
Parchin facility. 82 The process includes Iran providing explanations on the outstanding
issues by August 15, 2015, the IAEA reviewing the information by September 15, 2015,
technical meetings to resolve ambiguities, and a final assessment on the issues to the IAEA
Board of Governors by December 15, 2015.83 The parties met their targets, to include
the IAEA visiting the Parchin facility for the first time in September, accepting samples
from the facility collected by Iran while under surveillance84 and the release of the IAEA
Final Assessment.85
The Final Assessment document says:
77. See S.C. Res. 2231, T 7 (July 20, 2015). (Specifically terminating "provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006),
1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010), and 2224 (2015).").
78. S. C. Res. 2231, spra note 58, T 8.
79. Id., ¶¶ 11-13.
80. Id., ¶¶ 3-6.
81. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Road-map for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues
regarding Iran's Nuclear Program, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/2015/14 (July 14, 2015), https://www.iaea.org/sites/
default/files/gov-inf-2015-14.pdf.
82. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council
resolutions in the Islamic Republic ofIran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2011/65 (Nov. 8, 2011), https:/
/www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-65.pdf.
83. See IAEA, Road-map, supra note 81, TT 2-8.
84. Francois Murphy and Shadia Nasrallah, Samples taken at Iran's Parchin Military Site: U.N. Nuclear
Watchdog, REUTERS (Sep. 21, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/21/us-iran-nuclear-iaea-
idUSKCNORLOZO2015092 1#4q9QCztlBgj3z4KP.97.
85. IAEA, Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran's Nuclear Programme, IAEA
Doc. GOV/2015/68 (Dec. 2, 2015), available at http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/
IAEAPMDAssessment_2Dec2015.pdf [hereinafter Final Assessment].
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The Agency assesses that, before the end of 2003, an organizational structure was in
place in Iran suitable for the coordination of a range of activities relevant to the
development of a nuclear explosive device. Although some activities took place after
2003, they were not part of a coordinated effort . . . . The [IAEA's] overall
assessment is that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear
explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated
effort, and some activities took place after 2003. The [IAEA] also assesses that these
activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition
of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The [IAEA] has no
credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear
explosive device after 2009.86
Specific technologies the IAEA found to have characteristics consistent with
development of a nuclear explosive device include (1) exploding bridgewire detonators, 87
(2) multipoint initiation system,8 8 (3) computer modeling of such device,89 and (4)
explosive safety arrangements inherent to testing such a device.9 0 However, all but the
last item may have use in non-nuclear explosive applications. Related to the Parchin site,
the IAEA assessed the extensive modifications at a particular area within the Parchin site
"seriously undermined the [IAEA's] ability to conduct effective verification."91
IV. Surveillance and Privacy
A. UNITED STATES' LEGISLATION
On June 2, 2015, President Barak Obama signed into law the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over
Monitoring Act of 2015 ("USA FREEDOM Act of 2015").92 The new law significantly
reformed the existing surveillance apparatus, which had fallen victim to scrutiny following
the revelations made by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward
Snowden. Following the leaks, Section 215 had been at the center of contentious
litigation in the federal courts. The law revitalized Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, but
added significant restraints. Most notably, Congress ended the NSA's controversial bulk
collection program and added mandatory additional oversight of U.S. surveillance
activity. 9 3 Additionally, the law limited the government's methods in collecting telephone
metadata and added new transparency measures regarding intelligence collection.94 The
USA FREEDOM Act also requires phone companies to maintain phone records, which
the government could query if they receive intelligence of a specific potential threat.95
86. Id., ¶¶ 84, 85.
87. Id., T 40.
88. Id., T 46.
89. Id., T 62.
90. Id., T 67.
91. Id., T 57.
92. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 §103(a) (2015).
93. Id.
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The law also grants authority "to continue the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information . .. [for] a period not to exceed 72 hours" without a court order." 96
B. SURVEILLANCE LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Prior to the lapsing of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, various courts questioned the
statutory interpretation underpinning the U.S. surveillance program. In Am. Civil
Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015), the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act did not authorize the bulk telephone
metadata program conducted by the NSA. 97 Despite this determination, the court did not
specifically address the question of whether bulk surveillance violates the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 98 The court acknowledged the program's
potential benefit, but reasoned that, due to the extraordinary measures, Congress would
have to authorize such a program explicitly.99
When Congress passed the USA FREEDOM Act, it gave the government 180 days to
discontinue the bulk surveillance program. Judge Richard J. Leon supplemented the
Congressional timeline by issuing an injunction against the NSA's bulk metadata
collection program in Klayman v Obama, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).100 The decision
in Klayman was very narrow and applied only to specifically named Verizon customers.10 1
The court reasoned that the plaintiffs were likely to establish that the bulk collection
program violates the Fourth Amendment.102
C. SURVEILLANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Following an attack on satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, French lawmakers passed the
Surveillance Act (May 2015), which significantly expands the measures that the
government can use to conduct surveillance and specifically enables French intelligence
agencies to record telephone calls and text messages using technology that stores
information for later use.103 The law grants the intelligence agencies the authority to
conduct warrantless surveillance, allowing "the government to monitor phone calls and
emails of people suspected of connections to terrorism."1 0 4 Internet service providers
96. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 §701(a) (2015).
97. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper et. al, 785 F.3d 787, 824 (2d Cir. 2015). (Highlighting that the court
determined that "Congress is better positioned than the courts to understand and balance the intricacies and
competing concerns involved in protecting national security and to pass judgment on the value of the
telephone metadata program as a counterterrorism tool.").
98. Id. at 823-24.
99. Id. at 821.
100. Cody M. Poplin, D.C. District Court Isues Injunction in Klayman v. Obama, LAWFARE (Nov. 9, 2015,
1:46 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/dc-district-court-issues-injunction-klayman-v-obama.
101. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded; Barack Hussein Obama v.
Larry ElliottKlayman, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir 2015)(http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FCO%20201508
28116/OBAMA%20v.% 20KLAYMAN.)
102. Id.
103. Steve Dent, France gets its own Patriot Act' in wake of 'Charlie Hebdo' attack, ENGADGET (Jul. 24, 2015),
http://www.engadget.com/2015/07/24/france-surveillance-act/.
104. Arik Hesseldahl, France Has a Powerful and Controversial New Surveillance Law, RECODE.NET (Nov. 14,
2015 9:22 AM PST), http://recode.net/2015/1 1/14/france-has-a-powerful-and-controversial-new-
surveillance-law/.
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must install "black boxes" designed to capture and analyze metadata on general internet
activity and "make the data available to intelligence agencies." 05 The law has measures in
place that require the techniques and technologies used to collect intelligence to be
proportionate to the target. 06 Although law enforcement agents must consult a panel of
judges and legislators before conducting surveillance, the recommendation of the panel is
not binding.1o7
The European Court of Justice (ECJ), concerned with the United States' mass,
indiscriminate surveillance, invalidated the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor scheme which
thousands of companies relied on to transfer personal data to the United States. 08 An
Austrian citizen brought a complaint after he became aware of the United States'
surveillance activities. The suit alleged that the law and practices of the United States do
not sufficiently protect the data being transferred from surveillance by public
authorities.1 09 The ECJ determined that the United States Safe Harbor scheme enables
interference by United States public authorities and therefore compromises "the
fundamental right to respect private life" under EU law.11 0 In its judgment, it stressed the
fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union grants individual
member-states the right"' to investigate whether other states adequately protect data
transmission from government surveillance.112
V. Islamic State"n
The Islamic State (IS)114 continued its international campaign to entrench its self-
proclaimed caliphate, expanding from its territories in Syria and northern Iraq and
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Dent, supra note 103.
108. Liam Tung, Top EU Court Sinks Safe Harbor over US Spying and Rattles Tech Industry, ZDNET (Oct. 6,
2014 10:38 GMT) http://www.zdnet.com/arcle/top-eu-court-sinks-safe-habour-over-us-spying-and-rattles-
tech-industry/.




111. Id. ("This request for a preliminary ruling relates to the interpretation, in light of Articles 7,8, and 47 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ('the Charter'), of Articles 25(6) and 28 of
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L
281, p. 31).").
112. European Comm'n Press Release No. 117/15, The Court offustice Declares that the Commission's US Safe
Harbour Decision is Invalid (Oct. 6, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/
cpl50117en.pdf.
113. The distinctions discussed herein do not lend themselves to crisp topical divisions. There is so much to
touch on: as discussed herein, the Islamic State has new purported provinces. Additionally, combat
operations in Syria and Iraq against the Islamic State are not limited to those countries. The situation in
Syria is particularly muddled due to the presence of purported moderate Islamist groups opposed to Syrian
President Assad as well as Islamic State. Russia is (apparently) targeting any group in Syria opposed to Assad.
In Iraq, Iraqi Kurds and Iran are fighting the Islamic State in Iraq, with the United States wary of any
involvement with Iran. Finally, there is disagreement on an end state for the Assad Government.
114. Maria Vultaggio, ISIL, ISIS, Islamic State, Daesh, What's the Difference?, INT'L BusINEss TIMEs (Nov.
16, 2015, 6:26 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/isil-isis-islamic-state-daesh-whats-difference-
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proclaiming additional provinces, or "wilyat," in parts of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Algeria,
Libya, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia." 5s,11 6 The
establishment of a new province is a long and complicated procedure, and several groups
who have pledged allegiance to IS have yet to be recognized as provinces." 7
Most significant is the speed in which IS expanded from controlling territory in only
Syria and Iraq, to controlling territory in eight additional nations. Of these provinces,
officials characterize Libya as most significant. "Western officials familiar with
intelligence reports say it is the only affiliate now operating under the direct control of the
central Islamic State's leaders."11 Libya is "the hub from which [IS] project[s] across all
of North Africa."119 It may in fact serve as a fallback position, should IS lose its territory
in Syrian and Iraq.1 2 0
This accumulation of controlled territory provides a steady revenue base.121 Estimates
of IS's annual revenues approach US $3 billion. IS is estimated to control over US $2
trillion [sic] worth of assets.1 22 Though oil is the biggest component:
the better known of the Islamic State's revenue sources-smuggling oil, plundering
bank vaults, looting antiquities, ransoming kidnapped foreigners and drumming up
donations from wealthy supporters in the Persian Gulf-have all helped make the
group arguably the world's richest militant organization. But as Western and Middle
Eastern officials have gained a better understanding of the Islamic State's finances
over the past year, a broad consensus has emerged that its biggest source of cash
appears to be the people it rules, and the businesses it controls.123
2187131?rel=most-read2 (Highlighting that various entities refer to the group alternately as ISIS, ISIL, the
Islamic State, DMISH, and DAESH. This contribution refers to the group as the Islamic State or IS, which is
how the group refers to itself.).
115. Alessandria Masi, Islamic State Timeline Shows How ISIS Expanded in One Year from Two Counties to Ten,
INT'L BUSINESS TIMEs (Jun. 10, 2015, 8:18 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/islamic-state-meline-shows-
how-isis-expanded-one-year-two-countries-ten- 1959705.
116. Press Release, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, Office of the Spokesperson, Designations of Foreign Terrorist
Fighters (Sept. 29, 2015), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/247433.htm (In announcing
designations of foreign terrorist fighters, the United States acknowledged three of the groups: The Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant - Caucasus Province, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Khorasan's, and
Islamic State Sinai Province.).
117. See Masi, supra note 115.
118. David Kirkpatrick, Ben Hubbard, and Eric Schmitt, ISIS' Grip on Libyan City Gives it a Fallback Option,




121. Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Kulish, Steven Lee Myers, Predatory Islamic State Wrings Money from
Those it Rules, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/world/middleeast/
predatory-islamiic-state-wrings-money-from-those-it-r-ules.html?ribbon-ad-idx=6&rref=world/middleeast&
module=ArrowsNav&contentCollecon=Middle%20East&action=click&region=FixedLeft&pgtype=article.
122. See, e.g., ISIS/ISIL Funding Methods and Financial Crime Risks, THOMPSON REUTERs ACCELUS
WEBCAST (Nov. 24, 2014, 11-12 EST), http://info.accelus.thomsonreuters.biz/ISFundingMethods (Available
upon registration with Thomson Reuters).
123. Rosenberg, supra note 121.
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Population estimates in IS-controlled territory in Iraq and Syria alone vary from about
six and a half to ten million.1 24
The military response to IS features most prominently in daily news reports. Since
operations against the IS began on August 8, 2014, the United States has carried out 2,703
airstrikes in Syria, with the rest of the international coalition carrying out 154 in Syria.1 25
The United States' air operations became a little easier after Turkey agreed to allow the
United States the use of the Incirlik air base in July 2015.126 However, as of this writing,
the United States has carried out no air strikes in Syria after Russia deployed SA-400 anti-
aircraft missiles in the wake of Turkey's downing of a Russian jet on November 24,
2015.127
The authority for the United States' presence against IS in Iraq is an invitation from the
Iraqi government. Indeed, Iraq "requested the United States of America . . . lead
international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds, with our express
consent."1 28 The United States' authority to carry out operations against IS in Syria is not
clear, though it appears to be grounded in self-defense;129 and in that collective self-
defense is allowed where the territorial State (Syria) is 'unable or unwilling' to stop the
attacks itself. The authority to fight IS from a domestic United States view is also unclear.
President Obama has asked Congress for an explicit authorization to use force against IS,
but to no avail.1 30
124. See e.g., ISIS/ISIL Funding Methods and Financial Crime Risks, supra note 113; Anna Swanson, How the
Islamic States Makes its Money, Wonkblog, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/18/how-isis-makes-its-money/; Richard Barrett, The Islamic State, THE
SOUFAN GROUP at 8 (Nov. 2014), available at http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-
The-Islamic-State-Novl4.pdf.
125. U.S. DEPT OF DEFENSE, Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations Against ISIL Terrorists,
DEFENSE.Gov, http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve (last updated Mar. 15,
2016, 3:59 PM E.).
126. Liz Sly & Karen DeYoung, Turkey Agrees to Allow U.S. Military to Use Its Base to Attack Islamic State,
WASH. POST (Jul. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/turkey-agrees-to-allow-
us-military-to-use-its-base-to-attack-islamic-state/2015/07/23/317f23aa-3164-1le5-a879-
213078d03dd3_story.html.
127. No U.S. Airstrikes in Syria Since Russia Deployed S-400 Systems, RT.com (Nov. 28, 2015), https://www.rt
.com/news/323815-syria-s-400-us-airstrikes/.
128. U.N. Security Council, Letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the U.N. addressed to the
President of the Security Council, Annex (Sep. 20, 2014), U.N. Doc. S/2014/691, available at http://www
.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_691
.pdf.
129. David Hudson, President Ohama: We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL", WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(Sep. 10, 2014, 10:25 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we-will-degrade-
and-ultimately-destroy-isil ("[W]e will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are.
That means I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq.").
130. Amber Phillips, President Obama's Push for Military Authorization to Fight ISIS Won't Go Anywhere in
Congress. Here's Why., WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/
wp/2015/12/07/3-reasons-congress-wont-authorize-obamas-use-of-force-against-the-islamic-state/.
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France' 3' and the United Kingdom 32 joined the fight against IS in Syria after the IS
attacks against Paris in November 2015. This adds to the coalition members who have
already joined the fight in both Syria and Iraq.1 33
In addition to the ongoing United States-led coalition air campaign, on September 30,
2015, the Russian Parliament passed President Putin's request to approve air strikes in
Syria; within hours Russian airstrikes began.1 34 The Russian intervention is pursuant to a
request by Syrian President Assad for the assistance. Though Russia initially claimed to
be targeting IS, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov clarified, stating Russia would
target "all terrorists in Syria." 3 s
Attacking IS's finances is another essential aspect to defeating IS. In an effort to thwart
the IS's massive revenue-generation, twenty-six nations gathered to form the Counter
ISIL Finance Group (CIFG). Co-led by Saudi Arabia, Italy, and the United States, the
CIFG and its participant nations met three times to determine how to deal with the IS's
finances. The CIFG Action Plan states, "the unique terrorist financing challenges posed
by ISIL, and identifies and establishes key steps that Coalition members, and potentially
the entire international community, should undertake to disrupt ISIL's sources of
revenue, movement and use of funds, and its overall economic sustainment."1 36 The
CIFG developed an action plan at its first meeting in January, through which participating
countries agreed to:
(1) Prevent ISIL from accessing the international financial system;
(2) Counter the extortion and exploitation of assets and resources that transit, enter, or
originate from ISIL-held territory;
(3) Deny ISIL funding from abroad; and
(4) Prevent ISIL from providing financial or material support to foreign affiliates.137
Partly in response to the IS threat, the United Nation's Security Council passed
Resolution 2199, a broad effort calling on U.N. member nations to take action to impact
IS's oil trade, address the IS's purge, destruction, and marketing of cultural heritage in
Iraq and Syria. It also impacted its kidnapping and external donations, and eliminated IS's
131. Alissa J. Rubin & Anne Barnard, France Strikes ISIS Targets in Syrian in Retaliation for Attacks, NEW
YORK TIMEs (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/world/europe/paris-terror-attack.html.
132. Steven Erlanger & Stephen Castle, British ]ets Hit ISIS in Syria After Parliament Authorizes Airstrikes,
NEW YORK TIMEs (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/world/europe/britain-parliament-
syria-airstrikes-vote.html?_r=1.
133. The countries that have participated in the strikes in Iraq include: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Jordan, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom and the countries that participated in
Syria include: Australia, Bahrain, Canada, France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.
U.S. DEPT OF DEFENSE, supra note 125.
134. Russia ]oins War In Syria: Five Key Points, BBC NEws (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-34416519.
135. Id.
136. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Spokesperson, The Establishment of the Counter-ISIL
Finance Group in Rome, Italy (Mar. 20, 2015), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/03/239592
.htm.
137. Asst. Sec'y Daniel L. Glaser, U.S. DEPT OF TREASURY, The Third Counter ISIL Finance Meeting
Convenes at Treasury, TREASURY NOTES BLOG (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/
The-Third-Counter-ISIL-Finance-Meeting-Convenes-at-Treasury.aspx.
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access to financial infrastructure, arms, and related material.133 In response to threats
from IS and other terror groups in Libya, the Security Council passed Resolution 2214
and 2249.
VI. Other Developments
A. FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS
Increased international scrutiny is being paid to Western recruits joining IS, not to
mention Al Nasrah and a number of the groups battling for control in Syria, Iraq, Libya,
and elsewhere. Specifically, "the conflict in Syria, the successes achieved on the ground by
ISIS and other jihadist groups, and ISIS's formation of a self-proclaimed caliphate have
had a magnetic draw for many young Western Muslims."139 In the first half of 2015, cites
reported approximately 7000 foreign fighters arrived in Syria and Iraq to join terror
groups.1 40 Building on the actions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178, the
Security Council Committee, established pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) concerning
counter-terrorism, released two reports to assess Member States' capacity to stem the flow
of foreign terrorist fighters.141 The reports provide an assessment of actions taken by
various countries to address this threat, it included actions taken to counter violent
extremism, recruitment, and incitement to conduct terrorist acts, as well as to prevent
inter-state travel by foreign terrorist fighters. International concern in relation to
recruitment concerning foreign terrorist fighters1 42 found further expression in a
November 2015 Interpol meeting on the subject.1 43 Members discussed the issue of
138. S.C. Res 2199, 7399th sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/2199/2015 (Feb. 15, 2015), available at http://www.un
.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2199%20(2015) (illustrating the resolution similarly includes
a parallel call for action against Al Qaeda-affiliated Al Nusrah Front, as well as other Al Qaeda-affiliated
entities).
139. Lorenzo Vidino & Seamus Hughes, ISIS in America: From Retweets to RAQQA 1, 3 (George Wash.
Univ. eds., Dec. 2015), available at https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/
ISIS% 20in% 20America%20-%2OFull% 20Report.pdf.
140. Global Terrorism Index 2015, INST. FOR EcON. & PEACE, 1, 3-4, available at http://economicsandpeace
.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/1 1/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf.
141. See U.N. Security Council, Annex, Implementation of Sec. Council resolution 2178 (2014) by States affected
by foreign terrorist fighters, transmitted by letter dated 2 September 2015 from the Chair of the Security
Council Comm. established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to
the President of the Security Council, XX, U.N. Doc. S/2015/683 (Sep. 2, 2015), available at http://www.un
.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/NI527297_EN.pdf, see also U.N. Security Council, Annex, Implementation of Sec.
Council resolution 2178 (2014) by States affected byforeign terrorist fighters, transmitted by letter dated 13 May
2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Comm. established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001)
concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council, XX, U.N. Doc. S/2015/33 8
(May 14, 2015), available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/Ni514129_EN.pdf
142. S.C. Res. 2178, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2178, at 4-5 (Sep. 24, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/
docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf (Defined as persons "who travel or attempt to travel to a State other
than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their
territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration,
planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist
training.").
143. Press Release, Interpol, Interpol Counterterrorism Working Group Meeting on Foreign Terrorist
Fighters (Nov. 18-20, 2015) (Seville, Spain). availahle at http://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-media/
Events/2015/INTERPOL-Counter-Terrorism-Working-Group-Meeting-on-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-
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foreign terrorist fighters travelling from the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq and the
developing conflict zone in Libya.
B. SITUATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
In late October, as part of the longstanding U.S. freedom of navigation (FON)
program, the USS LASSEN and a nearby P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft,
transited along a seventy-two nautical mile loop around Chinese, Vietnamese, and
Filipino territorial holdings in the Spratly Islands.144 But confusion exists as to whether
the operation was done under innocent passage. The transit involves coming within six
miles of Subi Reef, a low tide elevation which the Chinese built up. A low tide elevation
does not generate a territorial sea,145 and if the operation was done under the concept of
innocent passage,1 46 the operation could be seen as an implicit acknowledgement of the
validity of a Chinese territorial sea claim around the reef.147 One explanation was that the
transit passed within twelve miles of Thitu Island, a Vietnamese-held island that does
generate a territorial sea.148 Similarly, a flotilla of three Chinese warships passed within
twelve miles of the Aleutian Islands after a joint operation with Russia.1 4 9 The Chinese
apparently did transit under innocent passage.
C. MIGRANT CRISIS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA
The migrant crisis in the Mediterranean region reached untenable levels this year due
to the ongoing crises in Syria and Libya. According to the International Organization of
Migration, as of January 1, 2015, 891,989 migrants5 o were estimated to have arrived in
Europe by sea, while over 3,600 people perished crossing the Mediterranean.' 5' In partial
response, the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 2240,152 which
authorized Member States for a period of one year to inspect, and if warranted, seize
vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya where there were reasonable grounds to
suspect they were being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from that
Seville,-Spain-18-20-November-2015/INTERPOL-Counter-Terrorism-Working-Group-Meeting-on-
Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters (stating Interpol's global role in this area was recognized in S.C. Res. 2178).
144. Sam LaGrone, Confusion Continues to Surround U.S. South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Operation,
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country. In the discussions leading up to its passage, the Libyan representative pointed
out that militias control Tripoli and the ports from which the migrant ventures depart.5 3
D. BOKo HARAM
Boko Haram, based in Nigeria, overtook the Islamic State as the world's deadliest terror
group.'5 4 Though originally promoting its own brand of Islam, IS recently accepted Boko
Haram as its Islamic State of West Africa Province. Boko Haram has staged attacks in
Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad. The United States is deploying 300 troops to Cameroon
at the government's invitation and will stay until no longer needed.155 The troops will
assist in airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.' 56
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